This paper mainly discusses the effects of media capture on local government accountability in undemocratic countries. Firstly, we construct the models with and without media capture from the perspective of incentive theory. Secondly, we conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes with and without media capture. The analysis shows that no media capture decreases the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage under whatever conditions, and at the same time makes the central government's constraint to incentivize the local offi cial to exert effort easier to be satisfi ed under some conditions, while harder to be satisfi ed under other conditions.
Introduction
Generally speaking, the mass media have a tremendous impact on collective decisionmaking (Stromberg, 2001; Corneo, 2006) , although the news organization's internal structure and market forces are critical determinants of their power over public opinion (Bovitz et al., 2002) . In this paper, we analyze the effects of media capture on local government accountability in undemocratic countries through an incentive theoretical approach. When there is no media capture, the local offi cial will restrain himself, and seldom misbehaves. However, when there is media capture, the local offi cial will be unbridled, and usually misbehaves. Although the media play an important role in local government accountability, there is no related literature on their functioning mechanism when the media are controlled by the central government, especially in those undemocratic countries. We do not try to explain the reason why the features of the media market determine the ability of the government to exercise such capture and hence to infl uence political outcomes, just as Besley and Prat (2006) do, but we try to extend their analysis to the case of politically centralized but economically decentralized countries (e.g., China) through a very different approach. In these countries, voters' ballots play a trivial role for the local offi cial to retain his post, while
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the central government's appointment plays a crucial role, which is greatly different from the well-known canonical political agency model (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986) .
Certainly, as for undemocratic countries, almost all the media are controlled by the central authorities in a unifi ed way, and at the same time the local media are strictly administered by the local governments who are in charge of them. There is interregional media monitoring, as different media are in charge by different local governments, which will alleviate media capture to some degree. The central government is responsive to popular resentment toward the malfeasant local offi cials, and this kind of responsiveness is just like what Burgess (2002, 2003) have analyzed. As for the local offi cial, once his misbehavior is reported by the media, he will almost have no chance to be promoted to a higher position.
Our basic idea is that for an undemocratic country, media capture is caused by the central government's censorship, and that the media can be used by the central government to monitor the local governments. That is to say, to capture the media or not can act as a feasible strategy for the central government to oversee the local governments, however, not to capture the media will incur some expected social instability cost to the central government. For analytical simplicity, we do not consider other kinds of media capture, such as media capture by the local offi cials, in which the local offi cials bribe the reporters in exchange for promises not to reveal their misbehavior. There is some evidence which supports our main motivation. For example, in China, as the degree of economic decentralization becomes higher and higher, the degree of media freedom does not change at the same level. In fact, the degree of media freedom is controlled by the central government fi rmly, which often issues censorship guidelines to the mass media, and local governments do not have this kind of censorship right at all.
In order to convey our idea, we assume that the central government is benevolent, who decides the local offi cials' careers and prospects. When the media are captured by the central government, local offi cials do not have the incentive to exert productive effort. When the central government censors the media strictly, the media are captured totally, which does good to local offi cials. However, when the central government censors the media loosely, the media are captured partially, which does harm to local offi cials. For the sake of social stability, the central government generally censors the media between strictly and loosely according to its domestic political and economic situation. We try to conduct a comparative analysis of the central government's effects on local offi cials when the central government chooses different censorial strategies, to capture the media or not to capture the media.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 offer the model with and without media capture. Section 4 conducts a comparative analysis of the two distinctive models. Section 5 extends the basic models. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
The Model with Media Capture
In this section, we follow Laffont and Martimort's (2002) analytical framework. In order to make their benchmark tool be suitable for our analysis, we modify some parameters and introduce some new variables. It is assumed that the local offi cial is risk-neutral. When the local offi cial exerts discrete productive effort level {0,1} e  , the social added-value will be 0 V  with probability π(e), and 0 V  with probability 1 -π(e). V and V represent the values realized in the case of success and failure, respectively. π(1) denotes the success probability when the local offi cial expends effort, and 1 -π(1) denotes the failure probability when the local offi cial expends effort. That is to say, (1) Pr( 1) VV e    . Similarly, π(0) stands for the success probability when the local offi cial does not spend effort, and 1 -π(0) stands for the failure probability when the local offi cial does not spend effort. That is to say, (0) Pr( 0) VV e    . π(1) > π(0) means that the success probability becomes bigger when the local offi cial chooses to work harder. When the local offi cial's performance is good, he can get a bonus, however, when his performance is bad, he will get no punishment. That is to say, he faces limited liability. When there is media capture, the local offi cial's moral hazard is very diffi cult to be detected. For the sake of analytical simplicity, we neglect the role of the internal control mechanism of the central government which aims at assessing local offi cials' profi ciency. When the local offi cial does not exert productive effort, his effort cost is 
In order to make the local offi cial spend effort, the central government must fi nd an optimal compensation plan{( , )} tt . Under this plan, the central government's programming problem will be:
(1), (2), and (3) are the local offi cial's incentive compatibility, participation, and limited liability constraints, respectively.
Solving this programming problem, we obtain:
The superscript C* stands for second-best state with media capture. * C t is the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage with media capture. We can fi nd that this effi ciency wage is positively related to effort cost and negatively related to the difference of success probabilities.
In addition, we need to consider the central government's constraint to incentivize the local offi cial to expend effort:
It is quite obvious that (6) can be simplifi ed into:
Only when (7) is satisfi ed the central government has the incentive to make the local offi cial exert effort.
The Model without Media Capture
When there is no media capture, the local offi cial will be monitored by the media which he is not in charge of. When the local offi cial does not expend productive effort, it is very easy to be detected by the media. So the local offi cial's effort cost when he does not expend effort is 0 0 N . In other words, the media's monitoring will raise the local offi cial's shirking cost, which brings about great inconvenience to the local offi cial. The central government's new programming problem with no media capture will become: Solving this new programming problem, we obtain:
The superscript N* represents second-best state with no media capture.
* N t is the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage with no media capture, which is obviously different from that with media capture. 
. (15) It is quite obvious that (15) can be simplifi ed into: 
It is quite obvious that (17) can be simplifi ed into:
A Comparative Analysis
In this section, we will conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes with media capture and with no media capture. It is easy for us to obtain the following three propositions. (7) and (14), we obtain:
Under whatever conditions, the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage will be decreased, provided there is no media capture. In other words, media capture will increase the local offi cial's effi ciency wage. The economic intuition of Proposition 1 is that the central government can control the degree of media capture at the cost of increasing the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage. , then from (7) and (18), we obtain: , then from (7) and (16), we obtain:
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When there is no media capture, the central government's constraint to incentivize the local offi cial to spend effort will be easier to be satisfi ed under some conditions, while harder to be satisfi ed under other conditions. Although no media capture seems benefi cial to the whole society, the central government has to make a trade-off between this kind of benefi t and the expected cost of social instability. As c and ρ increase, the central government tends to capture the media, otherwise it tends not to capture the media. As long as the central government takes it for granted that the undisclosed truth plays an important role in its stable and legitimate ruling, it will not cancel the regulation in media, which will result in complete or partial media capture. For analytical simplicity, in this paper we do not consider the well-known media scrutiny paradox, which holds that the quality of offi ce holders falls if the selection effect is adverse and outweighs the screening effect (Sutter, 2006) .
In some undemocratic countries, the central government tries to differentiate between economic news and political news, and hence between economic effort and political effort. Therefore, there may exist different optimal degrees of media capture according to different kinds of effort. Certainly, media outlets in those countries have the incentive to push the coverage to the edge of censorship in order to attract as many readers as possible, and this may give rise to persistent media bias (Baron, 2006) , especially in undemocratic countries.
An Extension
In this section, we consider the case that there is externality. When there is no media capture, the existence of the mass media decreases the local offi cial's success probability 1  to 1   , where 11    . That is to say, when the local offi cial exerts effort, the mass media will do some harm to him which produces a putting-backward effect. The intuition behind this kind of externality is as follows. The local offi cial may exert effort at the expense of national macroeconomic stability or jurisdictional environmental cleanness. When this kind of behavior is reported by the mass media, the local offi cial's success probability will be reduced. In this case, the extended programming problem without media capture will become: (1 )
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* 0
The superscript NE* stands for second-best state without media capture and with externality. t NE* is the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage without media capture but with externality. 
It is quite obvious that (26) can be simplifi ed into:
 , then the central government's constraint to incentivize the local offi cial will be:
It is quite obvious that (28) can be simplifi ed into:
When we conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes with media capture and that without media capture but with externality, it is easy for us to obtain the following two propositions. (5) and (25), we obtain:
Remark 1: Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 1, we can fi nd that externality does affect the conditions under which no media capture decreases the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage. The more externality there is, the more uncertain the decrease effect in Propositions 1 and 4.
Proposition 5:
If there is externality, no media capture will make the central government's constraint to incentivize the local offi cial easier to be satisfi ed when 
, then from (7) and (27), reminding that (7) can be transformed to
, we obtain: (7) and (29), reminding that (7) can be transformed to
, we obtain:
Remark 2: Comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 2, we can fi nd that externality does play an important role in determining the conditions under which the central government has the incentive to motivate the local offi cial, and that it does make the problem more complex and more subtle for us to tackle. Our extension is based on a case that is more real-life where 11    analyze all these cases. However, in order to make our analyses be of real-life interest, we intentionally neglect these uninteresting cases.
Conclusion
In order to analyze the confl icting effects of media capture, we conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes with and without media capture. The analysis shows that media capture will enhance the local offi cial's equilibrium effi ciency wage, and at the same time make the central government's constraint to incentivize the local offi cial to exert effort easier to be satisfi ed under some conditions, while harder to be satisfi ed under other conditions. In a word, media capture does harm to the whole society, but as for an undemocratic country it can bring about social stability, so the central government has to make a trade-off between the benefi t and cost. Because these undemocratic countries are different from democracies in political institutions, the causes of their media capture are fundamentally different, too. Although a free press is a bad news for corruption (Brunetti and Weder, 2003) , it is also a bad news for social stability in some undemocratic countries. Just as Djankov et al. (2003) support that government ownership of the media undermines political and economic freedom, our analysis shows that this is because undemocratic countries are afraid of social instability resulting from people's resentment toward misbehaving local offi cials which will challenge their ruling legitimacy to some extent. Our contribution is that we fi nd out the effects of media capture on local government accountability in undemocratic countries. We should consider the implicit conditions of a country when we undertake related theoretical analyses, and we think this short paper is an attempt to fi nd some undemocratic countries' implicit conditions which should not be ignored. As for democratic countries, media capture is mainly caused by infl uential interest groups (e.g., Corneo, 2006; Petrova, 2008; Chan and Suen, 2009) , and local governments are accountable for jurisdictional residents. However, as for undemocratic countries, media capture mainly arises from the central government, and local governments are responsible for the central government.
